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Zarys rozwoju sankcji w polityce zagranicznej  
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Abstrakt: Już od czasów starożytnych w ramach prowadzonej przez różne podmio-
ty polityki zagranicznej stosowano sankcje, równolegle z prowadzonymi konflikta-
mi zbrojnymi lub oddzielnie, w celu osiągnięcia określonych celów politycznych.  
Z upływem czasu sankcje ulegały ciągłej transformacji obejmującej rodzaje, jak rów-
nież procedury decyzyjne skutkujące ich nakładaniem. Artykuł dostarcza przeglądu 
procesu przekształcania się charakteru sankcji od prymitywnych narzędzi nakiero-
wanych na osiągniecie jednego prostego skutku, po wyrafinowane środki, służące 
określonemu porządkowi międzynarodowemu, stanowiące efekt wieloetapowego 
procesu decyzyjnego i niosące ze sobą różnorodne następstwa. Studium oparto  
o najbardziej spektakularne przykłady zastosowania sankcji w historii ludzkości.  
 
Abstract: Since the ancient times sanctions have been applied in the course of vari-
ous foreign policies in parallel with the ongoing armed conflict or separately in or-
der to achieve certain political objectives. Over time, sanctions have undergone con-
tinuous transformation including types, as well as the decision-making procedures 
resulting in their application. The article provides an overview of the process of 
transformation of the nature of the sanctions beginning with primitive tools aimed 
at achieving one simple effect to elaborate measures used for a particular interna-
tional order, resulting from a multi-stage, decision-making process and having  
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a variety of consequences. The study is based on the most spectacular examples of 
applied sanctions in the history of mankind. 
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Introduction 
 
The concept of international sanctions has been around at least from 
the time of the Bronze Age when its use was firstly recorded. They accom-
panied armed conflicts, but also were employed separately in order to 
achieve certain political objectives. Since then, different forms of sanctions 
and imposing procedures have been developed – from archaic measures 
aiming at achieving a single result and imposed in a simple decision-making 
process to complex instruments of international law against certain groups 
or interests which result from multistage decisions based on democratic 
principles. Considering that, the development of international law over cen-
turies hand in hand with political systems remains impressive.  Due to the 
extent of the problem and very limited nature of this study, only the main 
development trends of international sanctions in the history of countries and 
societies will be presented and supported by the most spectacular examples.  
 
Sanctions from antiquity to modern times 
 
Since the ancient times we have observed frequent uses of the army 
and the embargo, understood today as economic sanctions under interna-
tional law, being effective tools for implementing policy objectives. Empires 
creation could not do without these two elements of pressure1. One of the 
earliest studied sources of sanctions dates from about 8th–7th century BCE, 
during the reign of the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser III who created the first 
in the history professional standing army and special engineering forces for 
                                                          
1 See http://www.politykaglobalna.pl/2010/06/narodziny-imperium/ (dostęp: 17. 
08.2016). 
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strengthening his power. A special selection of recruits, training, excellent 
equipment and armament of the army gave the Assyrian king power over 
the world. The road network and the postal service supported the prosperity 
of the empire that collapsed as a result of the Medes invasion preceded by 
long economic sanctions. The Assyrian army suffered horrendous casualties 
under numerous campaigns of conquest and was dependent on import of 
warhorses from Media. Cutting off the horse supply to the Assyrian king 
Ashurbanipal, and the constant pressure on the external borders of the em-
pire are one of the first known in the history effective employment of eco-
nomic sanctions2. 
Another spectacular ancient example of economic sanctions imposed 
in times of peace is the Megarian Decree that, however, brought counterpro-
ductive results3. In 432 BCE Athenian Pericles banned Megarians goods 
from Greek city-states. All this to punish and deter Megara on the support 
provided to Sparta in the conflict against Athens, and as retaliation for refus-
ing to join the Delian League under the leadership of Athens. The effects of 
the sanctions affected mainly civilians of Megara. As a result, this led to the 
outbreak the Peloponnesian Wars a year later and the loss of hegemony in 
the region of Athens, which allowed Sparta to become a leading power in 
Greece. The lesson learned shows that sanctions which have been imposed 
hastily almost always turn against imposer.   
In ancient times, sanctions, particularly economic ones, were the nat-
ural complement to military tools4. A good example of this practice is the 
embargo imposed against the Gauls by the Roman Empire on trade of gold 
and silver during 232–225 BCE. Interestingly, the ban also included those 
non-citizens of Rome and living in third countries. In the late period, the 
Roman Empire was known more as an advocate of free trade than political 
barriers. However, Roman legions carefully watched the exported goods, 
mainly weapons and precious metals, so they could not reinforce militarily 
their adversaries. Even in the seventh century CE, when the western part of 
the Empire was limiting the exchange of goods as a result of invasions, in 
                                                          
2 I. Eph’al The Ancient Arabs: Nomads on the Borders of the Fertile Crescent 9th-5th Centu-
ries B.C., Jerusalem 1982, p. 147–170. 
3 H.G. Askari, G. Hossein, J. Forrer, H. Teegen, J. Yang, Economic sanctions. Examin-
ing Their Philosophy and Efficacy, Westport/USA 2003, p. 5–7. 
4 W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, Oxford 1979, p. 198. 
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the eastern part Alexandrian merchants were trading with the Gauls without 
any restrictions, the same in Greece with the Visigoths5. 
In the process of political systems development, the role of economic 
sanctions was increasing as a complementary tool to foreign policy of many 
governments. It also reflected the needs of internal policy and economic 
needs. We can observe the process of institutionalisation of the instrument 
and its natural inclusion into the catalogue of measures of international rela-
tions as a result of a sudden increase in economic exchanges between the 
politically divided and fragmented partners6. Since the beginning of the 
Middle Ages, embargo has gradually transformed into a complex mecha-
nism of export control for internal needs and in particular for shaping the 
international order. Some say that in the medieval period embargo, being  
a trading ban in relations between equivalent subjects of international law, 
began being instrumentally used in order to achieve purely political results – 
for political economy, understood as the weakening economy object result-
ing in the inevitable weakening of political structures7. We can only multiply 
example of this procedure from economic sanctions between Venice and 
Genoa, Flemish cities, the Hanseatic League, and even imposing by the Eng-
lish kings. 
In the days of the formation of modern political and economic pow-
ers, an excellent example of the employment of economic sanctions in inter-
national politics trying to incorporate in the process the greatest possible 
number of countries under the personal leadership was the so-called “Con-
tinental System” installed by Napoleon on November 21, 1806 by the Berlin 
decree.8 Unfortunately, it is also an example of far-reaching results of impos-
ing tough sanctions on a wide scale affecting countries other than the target, 
over which Napoleon lost control. France, based on the Berlin decree, intro-
duced an international ban for European vessels on sailing to British ports or 
other territories under its sovereignty and similarly for British vessels on 
sailing to European ports. To the content and formulation, the document 
                                                          
5 A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A social, Economic and Administrative 
Survey, Baltimore 1964, p. 824. 
6 S. Stantchev, Spiritual Rationality. Papal Embargo as a Cultural Practice, Oxford 2014, 
p. 1. 
7 S. Stantchev, Spiritual Rationality…, p. 2. 
8 See full text http://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/articles/ 
the-berlin-decree-of-november-21-1806/ (dostęp: 17.08.2016). 
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remains an excellent example for consistent description of the situation, dis-
position and sanctions provided. By imposing this economic sanction, Napo-
leon was seeking a response to the naval blockade of the French ports by the 
British navy. For the UK the economic tensions with France were the kind of 
everyday life since the Middle Ages, and as of 1660 mutual economic sanc-
tions were a permanent state9. The history shows that the most evident re-
sult of Napoleon’s sanctions was the involvement of Russia intending to re-
establish the wood trade with the Great Britain in 1810. These materials have 
always been used by British shipyards to build warships. Napoleon under-
stood that creating for Russia an exception in the Continental System would 
create a pull factor for other countries. Therefore he decided on a military 
intervention in Russia, which resulted in irreparable losses and the fall of 
Napoleon’s Empire. It shows that he did not learn very much from the les-
sons of the ancient world history. 
 
Sanctions as a tool of global players 
 
The attractiveness of sanctions as means to achieve political and eco-
nomic goals in the medieval period and subsequent ages was recognized by 
the Papacy, which was extremely eager to take advantage of them, achieving 
not only political and economic goals, but also giving them moral and reli-
gious meaning. They did not serve to achieve higher goals, but rather short-
terms interests, also aiming at recognition of sovereignty or controllability of 
certain social and religious groups10. One of examples are trade restrictions 
imposed by the Papacy from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, as part 
of international policy i.a. towards entire groups of Christian-heretics, or-
thodox Christians, Jews and Muslims. The restrictions were part of a rela-
tively orderly legislation imposed in an institutionalised way. 
The organisation of Hanse cities is a very interesting object of studies 
on the evolution of total economic sanctions towards the beginning of smart 
sanctions, forced by the limited instrumentation. In the implementation of 
its political and economic objectives, the Hanseatic League had at disposal 
three types of measures: negotiations, trading suspension and war. The sus-
                                                          
9 E.F. Hecksher, H. Westergaard, The Continental System : en economic interpretation,  
Gloucester 1964, p. 13. 
10 S. Stantchev, Spiritual Rationality…, p. 11. 
32                                                                                             Mariusz Boguszewski 
 
pension of trade was associated with the financing cessation of rulers being 
in conflict with the Hanseatic League, while the support for the member 
cities was still provided. This measure was imposed in the conflict of cities 
with the sovereigns of Braunschweig and Mecklenburg in 139611 It is also an 
early example on how non state organisations paly on different tools to de-
fend its interests against regular state organisms.  
The experience of the First World War ended in 1918 associated with 
huge losses in each field has brought the reflection on the need to establish  
a supranational organisation for peace in the world, curbing conflicts among 
countries by arbitration in the first place, preventing external aggression, 
establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was includ-
ed in Covenant of the League of Nations signed on 28 April 191912. Howev-
er, the failure of decision-making, caused mainly by the unanimity require-
ment, voluntary application of sanctions by the member states, maladjust-
ment of priorities for action in relation to the sovereignty of countries in 
making decisions put into question the desirability of application of sanc-
tions and effectiveness of the whole organisation13. The flagship example of 
that is the history of sanctions against Italy in connection with the aggression 
against Abyssinia of 3 October 1935, called by historians "Italian experi-
ment”. Fifty of the fifty-four member states of the General Assembly recog-
nized the violation by Italy of Article 12 of the Covenant. The subcommittee 
of eighteen countries whose participation was to ensure the success of sanc-
tions urgently recommended a set of measures against Italy, which formally 
came into force on 18 November 1935. The sanctions included a ban on the 
import of goods of Italian origin, a ban on the export of weapons and related 
materials, goods that could strengthen military capacities (especially metal 
ores, caoutchouc), as well as a ban on financial transactions with individuals 
and institutions under the Italian jurisdiction. The sanctions were however 
ineffective as to its main objective. They did not lead to the end of the con-
flict in Abyssinia what was the main purpose of the Decree and publicly 
repeated. However, it led to a significant reduction (by 53%) in Italian ex-
ports a year after the imposition of sanctions14. On that basis one may con-
                                                          
11 P. Dollinger, The German Hansa. London 1999, p. 109. 
12 See full text http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html (dostęp: 17.08. 
2016). 
13 J.M. Farrall, United Nation Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge 2007, p. 59.  
14 Ibidem, p. 54–57. 
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clude that these sanctions were not completely out of influence to Italy. On 
the other hand, having in mind the procedure implied to reach the decision 
on them and non-achievement the main goal, the finding on institutional 
weakness of the League of Nations remains justifiable. 
United Nations 
The United Nations established on 24 October 1945 under the United 
Nations Charter is the successor organisation to the League of Nations15, 
currently bringing together 193 countries. As a global player, the organisa-
tion tries to avoid the mistakes made by its predecessor and respond to any 
serious violations of international order. Currently, the UN Security Council 
holds 630 sanction regimes against individuals and 395 against companies16, 
hitting at least in several areas of activity: travel bans / freezing of assets of 
individuals and institutions, diplomatic restrictions, embargo on arms sales, 
restrictions on trade and transport, as well as other embargo and restrictions 
in the most important economy sectors for the subject of sanctions. These 
instruments are defined as targeted or intelligent sanctions17. 
European Union 
From the perspective of the experience of the League of Nations and 
the United Nations, it can safely be argued that the European Union in the 
course of each treaty reform aims to consolidate and strengthen its compe-
tence in the field of foreign policy, including the imposition of sanctions. The 
observation of practice in this field allows identifying three main trends. The 
first is an autonomous activity of the EU, which decides independently to 
impose specific restrictive measures on a third country most often in the 
absence of the reaction of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The second 
trend concerns the obligation for the EU to implement sanctions that have 
15 The United Nations Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice and the 
Agreement establishing the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. Dz.U. 
1947, nr 23, poz. 90, p. 261–347. 
16 Data updated on 12 May 2016, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/ 
un-sc-consolidated-list#individuals 
17 J.T. Biersteker, E.S Eckert, M. Tourinho, Designing United Nations Targeted Sanc-
tions: Findings from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium, Geneva 2012, p. 3–15 
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been imposed by the UNSC. This requirement results directly from the obli-
gation of the EU Member States to comply with the UNSC resolutions. The 
European Union promotes uniform and effective application of sanctions 
and protection of the smooth functioning of the common market. The third 
trend, being a consequent development of the second one, includes situa-
tions when EU decisions strengthen and complement UNSCR resolutions. 
The last trend is an extremely important element of the EU's activity. It is 
estimated that about 82% of sanctions imposed by the EU are measures that 
go beyond the UNSC resolutions18. The European Union, bearing in mind 
the experience with the sanctions policy, particularly against Iraq, imposed 
in the nineties of the last century, which due to its global nature in the field 
of economy have led to a humanitarian catastrophe among the civilian pop-
ulation, consistently expands the employment of so-called smart sanctions19. 
In principle, they do not cover the entire nation, but target individuals, so-
cial groups or certain sectors of the economy. 
There are three types targeted sanctions most often mentioned in the 
doctrine20. The first relates to personal sanctions against certain individuals. 
For this purpose blacklists containing targeted individuals names and other 
information allowing their identification are featured. The most common 
consequences of this kind of sanctions are travel restrictions to certain terri-
tories, bans on issuing visas or having bank account abroad, as well as freez-
ing financial assets of targeted individuals. The second type of targeted sanc-
tions – selective sanctions – affects specific sectors of the economy. They 
consist of partial embargoes, bans on import and export of certain goods and 
services, bans on investments or payments and the freezing of assets of cer-
tain operators. This type of targeted sanctions affects more sectors of the 
economy than individuals. The third type of sanctions are traditional diplo-
matic sanctions listed in Article 41 of the UN Charter. The most radical 
measure is a rupture of diplomatic relations. Other sanctions are less spec-
tacular, for instance the lowering the rank of the representation, the expul-
sion of attachés, the suspension of membership in an international organisa-
tion, the recall of ambassadors or the limitation of contacts. 
18 C. Portela,  The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions Evaluating effectiveness, CEPS Publi-
cations 2014, No 391, p. 3–6.  
19 J. Mueller, K. Mueller, Sanctions of Mass Destruction Essay, EBSCO 1999, vol. 78, 
issue 3, p. 43. 
20 C. Portela, The EU’s Use of…, p. 6.  
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The current political situation in the neighbourhood of the EU, par-
ticularly the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a test of internal solidarity and the 
institutional and political capacity in the filed of imposing sanctions. Look-
ing at the sequence of steps undertaken by the EU, one must remember that 
the EU acted at three different levels. Firstly, it has imposed travel re-
strictions and the freezing of assets of individuals and legal entities respon-
sible for undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence 
of Ukraine, as well as for activities against the Constitution of Ukraine, refer-
ring to the future status of any part of its territory21. Secondly, the sectoral 
restriction measures include restrictions on access to the capital of Russia's 
largest state-owned banks and entities controlled by them and selected com-
panies from the energy and armaments sectors, the ban on arms exports, the 
ban on exports of dual-use goods and technologies and the ban on exports of 
equipment and technologies for oil exploration under extreme conditions22. 
Thirdly, the EU has introduced specific measures resulting from the non-
recognition policy of annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol. It has estab-
lished restrictions on the import of products from the Crimea to the EU, in-
vestments in the peninsula, the tourist sector and EU exports of specific 
products and technologies in the transport, telecommunications and energy 
sectors23. The sanctions imposed by the EU will last at least until 23 June 
2016. A lively debate on the effectiveness of the above-mentioned measures 
is currently taking place at the EU level. 
Conclusions 
The above short analysis leads to the conclusion that the catalogue of sanc-
tions as a tool of international policy of countries and supranational institu-
tions has extended over the centuries. Policy makers use them more willing-
ly in the expanding range of situations. At the same time, despite the above-
mentioned direction of "institutionalisation" of the process of imposing sanc-
21 so-called 2nd phase sanctions entered into force on 17 March 2014 and imposed by 
Council Decision 2014/145/ CFSP, with a total number of 151 individuals and 37 
legal entities. 
22 so-called 3rd phase sanctions entered into force on 31 July 2014 and imposed by 
the Council Regulation no 833/2014. 
23 Measures without connection to 2nd and 3rd phase sanctions imposed by the 
Council Regulation no 692/2014. 
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tions, the elementary attention to democratic decision-making process is 
maintained. In addition, each case of a sanction regime is considered and 
analysed individually. Indisputable seems to be a tendency to move from 
the employment of a global embargo towards tailor-made targeted or smart 
sanctions, the intention of which is to reach out to specific target groups, 
responsible for the violation of the international order. 
Today, in relation to how the goals of sanctions are understood, the 
most acceptable in view of the doctrine seems to be an opinion pointing at 
general common denominators24. Primary goals, publically revealed, are 
most often employ to make a target of sanctions comply with wishes of the 
sanctioning country or institution. They are usually the most difficult goals 
to achieve. Secondary goals underline symbolically the international prestige 
of the sanctioning country or institution having the moral legitimacy to act 
in a specific way. They also respond to expectations of certain domestic in-
terest groups, strengthening at the same time the position of the sanctioning 
country or institution. Tertiary goals affect politically the international situa-
tion in a real way. 
Sanctions can punish targeted nations or individuals in a situation of 
violation of a particular international order. With the moral legitimacy they 
may also prevent future violation of international norms. Without going into 
considerations on effectiveness of a particular type of sanctions, it is undis-
puted that both the classic embargo and targeted / intelligent sanctions raise 
costs to the sanctioning subject as to its target. The imposition is always pre-
ceded by a specific profit and loss account.  
The number of sanction regimes held today shows however, that the 
international community in the process if its development has less and less 
tolerance for behaviours violating international law and order. 
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